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The present chapter places its focus on the jurisdictional aspects of the Chagos Marine 
Protected Area Arbitration (Mauritius v. United Kingdom), Award of 18th March 2015, by 
examining the interpretation of the fishery limitation under article 297(3)(a) of the 1982 UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, in the context of the fourth submission made by 
Mauritius, and the manner in which the UK subsequently objected thereto. The chapter views 
that in relation to the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement article 32, incorporating by reference 
the fishery limitation, the pronouncements of the Tribunal’s majority on this matter have 
provided a rather dubious legal authority that may only be seen as an inconsistent obiter 
dictum for future reference. 
 
1 Introduction  
 
The disagreement between the Republic of Mauritius (Mauritius) and the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) over the declaration, by the latter within the context 
of its administration over the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT), of a Marine Protected 
Area (MPA) around the Chagos Archipelago on 1 April 2010 put under scrutiny the United 
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Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1  with respect to several provisions of both 
substantive and procedural nature, as well as lex specialis law between the Parties.2  
Mauritius contended that the unilateral declaration of the MPA took place in violation 
of the Convention, and other rules of international law not incompatible with it, in seeking to 
obtain an authoritative and binding declaration regarding its legality. In particular, Mauritius 
submitted four claims, in which requested the Tribunal to adjudge and declare that: first, the 
UK was not entitled to declare an MPA or other maritime zones because it was not the 
‘coastal State’ within the meaning of inter alia arts 2, 55, 56 and 76 of the Convention; 
and/or, second, having regard to the commitments that it has made in relation to the Chagos 
Archipelago, UK was not entitled unilaterally to declare an MPA or other maritime zones 
because Mauritius has rights as a coastal State within the meaning of inter alia arts 56(1)(b-
iii) and 76(8) LOSC; and/or, third, that UK should take no steps that may prevent the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CCLS) from making recommendations 
to Mauritius in respect of any full submission that Mauritius may make thereto regarding the 
Chagos Archipelago under art. 76 LOSC. UK, in response, counter-claimed that the Tribunal 
should declare itself without jurisdiction over each of the above claims, or in the alternative 
to dismiss them.  
The Tribunal found by a majority of three votes to two, that it lacked jurisdiction to 
consider Mauritius’ first two claims in holding that the dispute between the Parties had been 
expressed through these claims in fact concerned the question of sovereignty over the Chagos 
Archipelago; a matter that insofar as did not concern the interpretation or application of the 
                                                          
1  Signed in Montego Bay on 10 December 1982 and entered into force on 16 November 1994 
[1833UNTS3] (hereinafter the ‘Convention’ or LOSC). 
2 As such, they have been considered the undertakings made by the UK at the time of the detachment 
of the Chagos Archipelago and repeatedly reaffirmed thereafter;  qv., ‘Record of a Meeting held in 
Lancaster House at 2.30 p.m. on Thursday 23rd September 1965’[Mauritius Defence Matters, CO 
1036/1253] (hereinafter the ‘Lancaster House Undertakings’). 
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Convention divested the Tribunal of its jurisdiction to decide thereon. Concerning the third 
claim, the Tribunal, however, unanimously held that there was no dispute between the Parties 
concerning submissions to the CCLS and that it was therefore unnecessary to exercise 
jurisdiction in this respect on the issue.3 
The dispute, as such, featured not only important questions characterising the 
evolving rights and obligations of States regarding the protection and preservation of the 
marine environment, but moreover as these were put forward against the fundamental 
background of sovereignty, being one of the most iconic themes that run through general 
public international law, their legal nature transcended the jurisdictional limits of the 
Convention. In that sense, as it would have been inappropriate not to acknowledge the main 
intentions prompting Mauritius’ claims, it would be respectively futile – in view of the 
organic development of the Convention’s reach within a constitutional discourse 4 – to 
admonish such claims as ‘artificial and baseless’.5 Despite the lack of a substantive decision 
in view of the jurisdictional grounds on the two first claims, the disagreement being 
canvassed against claims of sovereignty it may have uttered the law of the sea in a post-
modern era, when States will need to revisit crucial issues that were intentionally dealt with 
                                                          
3 Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (Mauritius v. United Kingdom), Award of 18th March 
2015, Arbitration under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea / 
Permanent Court of Arbitration as the administering institution – case number 2011/03 (hereinafter 
‘Award’ or ‘Chagos award’), pg. 215 §547(A) dispositif. The decision has not been included yet in 
the Reports of International Arbitral Awards (RIAA), but it can be accessed directly, along all the 
materials cited, at <pcacases.com/web/view/11>. 
4 Among others, see P. Allott, “Mare Nostrum: A New International Law of the Sea”, American 
Journal of International Law 86 (1992): 764 and B.H. Oxman, “The Rule of Law and the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea”, European Journal of International Law 7 (1996): 353. 
5 Counter-Memorial submitted by the United Kingdom (15 July 2013), pg 3. ¶1.10. 
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vague and ambiguous drafting due to unresolved political differences 6 at the time in the 
context of package deal negotiations 7 and put its application in perspective in the light of 
other processes, such as the request for an advisory opinion by the International Court of 
Justice under the circumstances. 8 
In its last submission, Mauritius requested the Tribunal to adjudge and declare the 
MPA incompatible with the substantive and procedural obligations of the UK under the 
Convention, including inter alia arts 2, 55, 56, 63, 64, 194 and 300, as well as art. 7 of the 
United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and 
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (‘fourth 
submission’).9 Following the objections made by the UK, the Tribunal declared itself without 
jurisdiction based on art. 297(3)(a) LOSC (‘fishery limitation’) to pronounce on arts 63 and 
64 LOSC, and art. 7 UNFSA, but it found unanimously that its jurisdiction remained 
unaffected by the other limitation provided in art. 297(1) LOSC, and considered the fourth 
submission in relation to the remaining articles of the Convention. On the merits it found, 
also unanimously, that Mauritius holds: legally binding rights to fish in the waters 
surrounding the Chagos Archipelago; to the eventual return of the Chagos Archipelago when 
no longer needed by the UK for defence purposes; and to the preservation of the benefit of 
any minerals or oil discovered in or near the Chagos Archipelago pending its eventual return. 
                                                          
6  B. Buzan, “Negotiating by Consensus: Developments in Technique at the United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea”, American Journal of International Law, 75 (1981): 324. 
7 H. Caminos and M.R. Molito, “Progressive Development of International Law and the Package 
Deal”, American Journal of International Law, 79 (1985): 871. 
8 At the time of writing the present chapter, the United Nations General Assembly requested by means 
of Resolution 71/292 (22 June 2017) the Court to render an advisory opinion on the ‘Legal 
consequences of the separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965’. 
9 Signed in New York on 4 August 1995 and entered into force on 11 December 2001 [2167UNTS3] 
(hereinafter ‘the Agreement’ or UNFSA). 
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In finding so, the Tribunal held that UK failed to give due regard to these rights and breached 
its obligations under the Convention in declaring the MPA.10 
The present chapter places its focus accordingly on the jurisdictional aspects by 
examining the interpretation of the fishery limitation in the context of the fourth submission, 
and the interplay between the Convention and the Agreement, in arguing that in the context 
of the latter the pronouncements of the Tribunal have provided a rather dubious authority for 
future reference. The voluminous written submissions and lengthy hearings transcript reveal 
the considerable formative effect exerted by the pleadings at hearing on shaping the 
concluding arguments of the Parties. With regard to the fishery limitation in particular, 
Mauritius seemed to be throughout the proceedings locked in a sterile argument on 
sovereignty that deflected attention from, or obscured, promising yet in parts incoherently 
developed arguments that failed to make clear connections with the black letter provisions of 
the Convention, and even more so to establish a meaningful connection with those provided 
in the Agreement. On the contrary, the UK brought a robust objection strategy based on a 
conservative approach and ingrained in a thorough textbook analysis that sought to shine up 
to the Tribunal’s textual favouritism and downplay the latently underlying constructive 
ambiguities and unresolved issues in the provisions of the Convention. Overall, the dynamic 
of the arguments with regard to the fishery limitation, resembled to a situation of ‘bringing a 
knife to a gunfight’ with its interpretation resulting into an overly broad and unconvincing in 
all its brevity pronouncement by the Tribunal, while the minority tried to keep the provision 
intact by considering it inapplicable on the facts. Due to space restriction in the chapter, it is 
assumed that the reader has some prior knowledge of the Award, and of the facts surrounding 
the arbitration, along with the arguments advanced by the Parties in the course of the 
proceedings.     
                                                          
10 Award, pg. 215 §547(B) dispositif. 
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2 The Tribunal’s pronouncements on the fishery limitation 
 
Mauritius in the context of its fourth submission contended that the MPA was incompatible 
with the substantive and procedural obligations of the UK under the Convention, including 
inter alia arts 63, 64, as well as art. 7 UNFSA. On this point, the UK objected to the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal on the ground of the MPA constituting ‘a fisheries measure’,11 
which the Convention subsequently excludes from its third-party settlement procedures 
entailing binding decisions due to the operation of the automatic limitations in art. 297(3)(a) 
LOSC.12 The Tribunal in approaching the question of its jurisdiction rightly observed that the 
point dividing the Parties was the interpretation and application of art. 297 LOSC, which in 
turn essentially required the characterization proper of the dispute in this context. 13 In doing 
so, it did not accept that the MPA under the expansive terms proclaimed by the UK was 
solely a measure relating to fisheries.14 Siding for the rest of the argument on this point with 
the UK, the Tribunal’s ratio specific to the application of art. 297(3)(a) LOSC is to be found 
essentially in paragraphs 297, 299 and 300, along with an obiter dictum following up in 
paragraph 301, of the Award.  
The line of reasoning begins with the finding that part of the UK’s Lancaster House 
Undertakings addressed fishing rights, clearly related to living resources, yet insofar as these 
apply to the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), wherein the MPA was declared, they fall under 
the exclusion from jurisdiction as set out in art. 297(3)(a) LOSC. This is premised on the 
                                                          
11  ‘Hearing on jurisdiction and the merits, in the matter of arbitration between the Republic of 
Mauritius and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’ (22 April – 9 May 2014), 
Permanent Court of Arbitration – Arbitration under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (hereinafter ‘Final Transcript’), pg. 1274:22-3. 
12 Final Transcript, pg. 804:2-8. 
13 Award, pg. 111 §283. 
14 ibid., pgs 111–2 §286. 
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rejection of the argument posited by Mauritius that ‘a distinction can be made between 
disputes regarding the sovereign rights of the coastal State with respect to living resources, 
and disputes regarding the rights of other States in the [EEZ]’,15 which it would have seen 
only the former to be excluded from compulsory settlement.16 The Tribunal held that ‘the two 
are intertwined, and a dispute regarding Mauritius’ claimed fishing rights in the EEZ cannot 
be separated from the exercise of the United Kingdom’s sovereign rights with respect to 
living resources’, while in extrapolating even further it took the view that ‘in nearly any 
imaginable situation, a dispute will exist precisely because the coastal State’s conception of 
its sovereign rights conflicts with the other party’s understanding of its own rights’.17 
The reasoning was then directed to consider the procedural rights to consultation and 
coordination claimed by Mauritius pursuant to arts 63, 64 LOSC, and art. 7 UNFSA, which 
similarly to their substantive obligations, the Tribunal noted to arise directly from the 
Convention and apply wherever the nationals of another State fish for straddling or highly 
migratory fish stocks, without being depended on the Lancaster House Undertakings. The 
Tribunal accepted that arts 63 and 64 LOSC, as well as art. 7 of the UNFSA, are on their face 
fishery measures and consequently in their application within the EEZ are subject to art. 
297(3)(a) LOSC. In doing so, the Tribunal fitted in the line of reasoning the precedent of the 
Arbitration between Barbados and the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, relating to the 
delimitation of the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf between them,18 which 
contrary to Mauritius assertion, found to afford no basis for the proposition that procedural 
obligations are not caught by the fishery limitation, reiterating thus its holding that a 
                                                          
15 Final Transcript, pg. 477:16-9. 
16 ibid., pgs 1119 –122. 
17 Award, pg. 116 §297. 
18 Award of 11th April 2006, Arbitration under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea / Permanent Court of Arbitration as the administering institution – case number 
2004/02, (2008) RIAA XXVII, pgs 147–251 (hereinafter ‘Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago award’). 
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distinction between disputes in the EEZ of the coastal State over sovereign rights and those 
over the rights of another State cannot be maintained in either substantive or procedural 
terms. Likewise, it found no support in the award of the Southern Bluefin Tuna case, 
including the Separate Opinion by Sir Kenneth Keith,19 as argued by Mauritius.  
 
3 The fishery limitation under the Convention 
 
It has been rightly observed that Part XV, section 3, of the Convention, which provides for 
limitations and exceptions to the applicability of compulsory procedures, is fraught with 
ambiguity.20In contemplating the disruptive effect of the politically inspired limitations to the 
compulsory procedures it can be said that ‘the treaty is not a neat legal document, capable of 
withstanding, in all respects, the onslaught of detached legal criticism.’21 In this respect, the 
limitation that applies to fishery disputes may be considered unfortunately as a provision that 
exemplifies the drafting technique of a deliberately created uncertainty. A careful reading of 
the relevant provision exonerates indeed those sternly criticising the dispute settlement 
provisions under the Convention in this respect.22 The operating limitation is contained in art. 
                                                          
19 Southern Bluefin Tuna Case between Australia and Japan and between New Zealand and Japan, 
Award on jurisdiction and admissibility, Decision of 4 August 2000, Arbitration under Annex VII of 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea / International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes acting as ad hoc registrar, (2006) RIAA XXIII, pgs 1–57 (hereinafter ‘Southern 
Bluefin Tuna case’). 
20 A.L.C de Mestral, “Compulsory Dispute Settlement in the Third United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea: A Canadian Perspective”, in T. Buergenthal, eds., Contemporary Issues in 
International Law, Essays in Honor of Louis B. Sohn (Kehl: N.P. Engel, 1984), 182. 
21 A.O. Adede, “Prolegomena to the Disputes Settlement Part of the Law of the Sea Convention”, NY 
University Journal of International Law & Politics, 10 (1977-1978): 386. 
22 See among others, M.P. Gaertner, “The Dispute Settlement Provisions of the Convention on the 
Law of the Sea: Critique and Alternatives to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea”, San 
Diego Law Review, 19 (1982): 592 et seq. 
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297(3)(a) LOSC, which consists of three clauses – separated below for the convenience of the 
reader with vertical lines – and reads as follows: 
‘| Disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the provisions of this 
Convention with regard to fisheries shall be settled in accordance with section 2, | 
except that the coastal State shall not be obliged to accept the submission to such 
settlement of any dispute relating to its sovereign rights with respect to the living 
resources in the exclusive economic zone or their exercise, | including its 
discretionary powers for determining the allowable catch, its harvesting capacity, 
the allocation of surpluses to other States and the terms and conditions established 
in its conservation and management laws and regulations |.’ 
 
The categorical statement in the opening clause enunciates as a matter of principle, that a 
fishery dispute regarding the interpretation or application of the provisions of the Convention 
is subject to the compulsory settlement procedures of Part XV, section 2.23  This is also 
supported by the legislative history of the provision revealing that fishery disputes are in 
principle susceptible to compulsory procedures. More specifically, the dispute settlement 
procedures were the subject of extensive negotiations in the context of the informal working 
group on the settlement of disputes until 1975, at what time the issue opened for discussion in 
the plenary. During the 1974 Caracas session, the group produced a working paper containing 
a draft on dispute settlement, which was later officially circulated as a co-sponsored national 
proposal.24 Thereunder, a draft article being formulated in three alternative versions, made 
provision for compulsory procedures leading to binding decisions with respect to disputes 
presenting elements of a gross, or persistent, violation of the Convention or an alleged abuse 
                                                          
23 See, G. Singh, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Dispute Settlement Mechanisms 
(Delhi: Academic Publications, 1985), 137. 
24 A/Conf.62/L.7. 
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of the normal exercise of regulatory or enforcement jurisdiction of the coastal State. This 
principle was upheld also in the refined document that was developed during the 1975 
Geneva session.25On this premise, the President of the Conference prepared an informal text 
dealing exclusively with the settlement of disputes 26 to supplement the ‘Single Negotiating 
Texts’ prepared by the chairmen of the three committees. In relation to the applicable 
limitations, the President’s text, however, suggested a negative wording effectively 
overturning the principle of compulsory settlement regarding fishery disputes except from 
certain occasions. In particular, it was provided that: ‘Nothing contained in the present 
Convention shall require any Contracting Party to submit to the dispute settlement 
procedures…any dispute arising out of the exercise by a coastal State of its exclusive 
jurisdiction under the present Convention, except when…’. 27 
During the 1976 session, the President was called to review its text on dispute 
settlement in order to keep up with the Conference’s revision of the Single Negotiating Text 
(RSNT).28 In this respect the plenary debates of the 1976 New York session regarding the 
dispute settlement system in the RSNT revolved predominantly around ‘the most knotty 
problem’ in that context, which was ‘the scope of permissible limits of exceptions…and the 
type of disputes in which the parties might be free to exclude a system of binding settlement’ 
in viewing that ‘if exceptions were…too broadly defined, the value of the system would be 
nullified.’29 In his new document, the limitations continued to reflect the substance of the 
previous formulation but notably the wording of the draft article had departed from the 





29 J.N. Saxena, “Limits of Compulsory Jurisdiction in Respect of the Law of the Sea Disputes”, in 
R.P. Anand, ed., Law of the Sea: Caracas and Beyond (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
1980): 335. 
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negative formulation suppressing the principle of compulsory settlement. The conflict 
between the views, on the one hand, on the forthcoming economic zone having a sui generis 
nature distinct from the high seas, with those, on the other hand, considering the zone part of 
the high seas being subject to certain coastal State rights and jurisdiction, set the tone for an 
extensive discussion about the quality and quantity of the respective legal rights therein. 
Against this background, the provision on limitations regressed to an explicitly negative 
formulation in order to avow the exclusive fishing rights of coastal States within the zone. In 
doing so, the Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT) in its corresponding draft article 
read that: ‘No dispute relating to the interpretation or application of the provisions of the 
present Convention with respect to the living resources of the sea shall be brought before 
such court or tribunal unless…’30 Nevertheless, regardless of the above formulation being 
shaped as an exception to an exclusion, the intention of the provision was to retain the 
compulsory application of the binding procedures.31 
The rigid utterance to limitations, among other issues, precipitated the resumption of 
special negotiations in the form of separate working groups. The mandate of Negotiating 
Group 5, which examined the ICNT with respect to compulsory settlement, was carefully 
limited to those disputes concerning sovereign rights of coastal States in EEZ.32 In parallel to 
the 1978 session, the group managed to agree on a compromise formula, which was included 
                                                          
30 A/Conf.62/WP.10 (emphasis added). 
31 See, A.O. Adede, “Law of the Sea – The Integration of the System of Settlement of Disputes under 
the Draft Convention as a Whole”, American Journal of International Law 72 (1978):94–5; B.H. 
Oxman, ‘The Third United Nation’s Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 1977 New York Session’, 
72 (1978):67, 78ff., and E.D. Brown, “Dispute Settlement and the Law of the Sea: The UN 
Convention Regime”, Marine Policy 21 (1997): 22. 
32 See, Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Volume X, pg. 
6 (hereinafter ‘UNCLOS III Off. Records’). 
X UNCLOS III Off. Records 6. 
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in the Group’s Chairman Report.33The Plenary revised the ICNT along the proposed formula 
by circumscribing inter alia the purported broadness of limitations with the introduction of a 
comprehensive positive statement asserting ab initio the applicability of compulsory 
procedures to fishery disputes. More specifically, it was provided that ‘unless otherwise 
agreed or decided by the parties concerned, disputes relating to the interpretation or 
application of the provisions of this Convention with regard to fisheries shall be settled in 
accordance with Section 2 of Part XV of this Convention, except…’ 34 . Through an 
amendment of that nature, UNCLOS III could be seen at that stage as moving from the 
position of compulsory settlement to that of compulsory exclusions.35  The provision on 
limitations received its final significant redrafting in the context of the Informal Draft 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, where it was further restricted by the refinement of the 
introductory statement on the applicability of compulsory procedures entailing binding 
decisions, as to clarify that ‘disputes relating to the interpretation or application of the 
provisions of this Convention with regard to fisheries shall be settled in accordance with 
section 2, except …’. 36 Considering the above expression, Oxman has observed that it ‘refers 
to compulsory jurisdiction over all fisheries disputes, and then excludes sovereign rights only 
with respect to the living resources in the economic zone’.37 
Thus, although the opening clause can be constructed as stipulating that any fishery 
dispute (other than those strictly confined within EEZ) can as a matter of principle be 
                                                          
33 q.v., A/CONF.62/RCNG/1, and X UNCLOS III Off. Records 117 et seq. 
34 A/Conf.62/WP.10/Rev.1(emphasis added). 
35 See, Adede, 378–9. Considering the major unresolved issues underlying the negotiations at the time 
on dispute settlement, see A. Yankov, “The Law of the Sea Conference at the Crossroads”, Virginia 
Journal of International Law 18 (1977):31–41. 
36 A/Conf.62/WP.10/Rev.3 (emphasis added). 
37 B.H. Oxman, “The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Tenth Session 
(1981)”, American Journal of International Law 76 (1982):19. 
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submitted to its compulsory procedures – what in the proceedings during the Chagos 
arbitration was invariably referred to between the Parties and accepted as an affirmative 
grant of jurisdiction – immediately after, nonetheless, the second clause conveys the 
impression of a quasi counter-principle that coastal States shall not be obliged to accept the 
submission to such procedures of any dispute relating to their sovereign rights with respect to 
the living resources in the EEZ, or disputes related to the exercise of such rights. The 
impression in textual terms, nevertheless, that there is some scope to exclude disputes from 
judicial procedures other than those mentioned by name may be amplified by the 
grammatical inflection of the verb ‘include’ in gerund form – i.e., as a non-finite verb – 
serving practically as a clausal conjunction with the final clause that emphasises three 
limitations.38  
These, automatic exceptions, concern the discretionary powers of coastal States to 
determine the allowable catch in the EEZ, their harvesting capacity, the allocation of 
surpluses to other States, and the terms and conditions established in its conservation and 
management laws and regulations. Disputes falling into the aforementioned categories are to 
be submitted to non-binding conciliation under Annex V, section 2, of the Convention, when 
there is any allegation against the coastal State about a manifested failure to comply with its 
obligations to ensure through proper conservation and management measures that the 
maintenance of the living resources in EEZ is not seriously endangered;  an arbitrary refusal 
to determine, at the request of another State, the allowable catch and its capacity to harvest 
living resources with respect to stocks which that other State is interested in fishing; or an 
                                                          
38 The inflections of ‘y compris’ and ‘incluidas’ to be found in the French and Spanish text 
respectively carry out the same grammatical function as in the English text. The former, yet, deriving 
from the verb ‘comprendre ’ can be susceptible to more restrictive interpretations as to be read as 
having the cumulative meaning of ‘comprising’. 
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arbitrary refusal to allocate to any State, under the pertinent LOSC provisions, the whole or 
part of the surplus that it has declared to exist.39  
It is interesting to note, however, that the sweeping generality of the second clause in an 
ordinary and plain reading renders superfluous the specific stipulations that are mentioned by 
name in the third clause, since by definition, the EEZ is a zone wherein ‘the coastal State has 
sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the 
natural resources, whether living or non-living,…’ 40  Such superfluity can be effectively 
disposed only through a narrow interpretation of the purported counter-principle, as for 
example per the interpretation given to the scope of art. 56 LOSC in the Affaire Concernant 
le Filetage à l’Intérieur du Golfe du Saint-Laurent entre le Canada et la France.41 
It will be recalled that in the context of the Chagos proceedings, UK maintained an 
argument putting forward an overly general approach to the fishery limitation in holding that 
art. 297(3)(a) LOSC ‘is unambiguous and there is no basis for looking beyond its clear 
terms’. 42  It considered, furthermore, that in practice the provision effectively grants 
jurisdiction over fishery disputes in general and then excludes jurisdiction over fisheries 
disputes in the EEZ,43 without distinguishing in terms of jurisdiction between the exercise of 
sovereign rights on account of affecting or not other States,44 and with such rights to include 
a decision on granting or denying of fishing licences in the EEZ for the purpose of 
                                                          
39 LOSC, art. 297(3)(b). 
40 ibid., art. 56(1)(a).  
41 (‘La Bretagne Award’) Sentence du 17 Juillet 1986, (2006) XIX RIAA pgs 225–96, at pgs 255–6 
§50; see further W.T. Burke, “Coastal State Fishery Regulation under International Law: A Comment 
on the La Bretagne Award of July 17, 1986 (The Arbitration between Canada and France)”, San 
Diego Law Review 25 (1988): 495. 
42 Final Transcript, pg. 806:15-6. 
43 Counter-Memorial submitted by the United Kingdom (15 July 2013), pgs 163-4 ¶¶6.32-5. 
44 Final Transcript, pg. 1278:14-16. 
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conservation and management.45 As a result, it contended that ‘high seas fisheries disputes 
are within compulsory jurisdiction, EEZ living resources, quite deliberately, are not’.46 In 
support, it viewed that this reading is entirely consistent also with the UNCLOS III 
negotiating record,47 and in particular with the views expressed then by the delegation of 
Mauritius.48 On this specific aspect, a question posed by judge Wolfrum to the UK counsel 
sought to clarify as to whether the latter part of the fishery limitation, referred to above as the 
third clause, was to be read according to UK’s views to refer to everything done in the EEZ – 
concerning the conservation and management of living resources – or it did only apply to 
activities of the coastal State under arts 61 and 62 LOSC. In reply, it was further viewed that 
the general approach as put by the UK forward correlates in this context arts 56(1)(a) and 
297(3)(a), which echoed the anxiety of the coastal States during UNCLOS III to get hold of 
extensive powers to manage, conserve and exploit fish stocks and living resources in the 
EEZ, and embodies the outcome to their satisfaction to keep coastal State fisheries disputes 
out of court as far as possible.49 
Finally, on this point, a valuable insight into the Tribunal’s making of the Award as far 
as the fourth submission is concerned can be deduced from the joint Dissenting and 
Concurring Opinion issued by two of its members. While concurring that jurisdiction over 
Mauritius’s claims were depended upon the characterization of the Parties’ dispute, which 
consequently had a bearing on the interpretation and application of the automatic exclusions 
provided in art. 297(3) LOSC, it considered that since the decision on the case was one 
                                                          
45 ibid., pg. 1278:9-12. 
46 ibid., pg. 804:24-5. 
47 ibid, pgs 810:23 to 811:1, and 815:22-4. 
48 ibid, pgs 806:21-3, and 807:1-14. 
49 Final Transcript, pgs 813-6. 
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considering a MPA, rather than a decision on fishing, the fishery limitation did not apply.50 
The Opinion further viewed that if that limitation was to be considered applicable then it 
would need to be narrowly construed. More specifically, if the first part of the clause, 
whereby jurisdiction is confirmed, is to retain some meaning, not all disputes on fisheries can 
be interpreted as ‘any dispute relating to its sovereign rights with respect to living resources’, 
and therefore, the exclusions envisaged in the remaining of the provision must be narrower in 
scope.51 
 
4 The Chagos award in a state of limbo 
 
Having regard to the foregoing discussion, the Chagos award found a leeway to steer away 
the interpretation on the fishery limitation under art. 297(3)(a) LOSC from the principle of 
compulsory dispute settlement regarding straddling and highly migratory stocks by 
broadening the scope of limitations in the second and third clause. Indeed, as Boyle (who 
acted as one of the counsels for the UK in the Chagos arbitration) observed in his academic 
writings in the late 1990s, the negotiations in UNCLOS III and the text of the Convention 
itself, have left unanswered the difficult question whether disputes of this kind are within or 
outside the exclusion from compulsory binding settlement.52More emphatically, de Mestral 
had presaged, in early 1980s, that in fact the limitations provided for in art. 297 LOSC across 
                                                          
50 Dissenting and Concurring Opinion of Judges Kateka and Wolfrum, pgs 13 §50 and 15 §57. 
51 ibid., pg. 15§58. 
52 A.E. Boyle, “Problems of Compulsory Jurisdiction and the Settlement of Disputes Relating to 
Straddling Fish Stocks”, The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 25 (1999):11. I have 
not quoted Boyle’s views expressed in A.E. Boyle, “Dispute Settlement and the Law of the Sea 
Convention: Problems of Fragmentation and Jurisdiction”, International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 46 (1997), as himself stated (see Final Transcript, pg. 812:9-12) that his views therein were 
consistent with the argument pleaded on behalf of the UK, despite being invoked differently in the 
Reply of the Republic of Mauritius (18 November 2013), Volume III. 
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the three paragraphs can be interpreted either broadly or narrowly (restrictively), as there is 
nothing in the Convention to imply a broad exclusion of the application of compulsory 
settlement procedures to disputes arising in the EEZ per se.53 Assuming a strict adherence of 
international courts and tribunals to the doctrine of jurisprudence constante, the Chagos 
award may have bequeathed to case-law thus a rather doubtful authority in terms of its 
subsequent application concerning the fish stocks in question under the ambit of the 
Agreement’s provisions. Consequently, the question is whether any ground exists to 
distinguish the Award in the context of the Agreement. To this end, three points may open the 
prospect for such discussion. 
First, by looking in more detail at Mauritius’ strategy to circumvent the application of 
art. 297(3) LOSC ‘taken as a whole’,54 it will be recalled that it had primarily argued for a 
correlation between arts 56 and 297 LOSC with a view to drawing a distinction between the 
effect of the provisions on the coastal sovereign rights and the rights of third States in the 
EEZ. In doing so, it advanced that since in relation to the latter it would involve only the 
jurisdiction of the coastal State, disputes of that kind would not be caught by the fishery 
limitation.55 The backup argument was that even if the dispute were to be characterized as 
one related to fishing, it would not fall within the exceptions provided in art. 297(3)(a) 
LOSC. The substantiation for this, however, was rather thin and did not withstand the 
pressure mounted by UK’s objections. As it was put in its written submissions, and 
emphasized further in the oral pleadings, Mauritius contended ‘UK’s failure to respect 
Mauritian fishing rights in the EEZ’,56 in averring more specifically that: 
                                                          
53 de Mestral, 183. 
54 Award, pg. 99 §249, and in the Final Transcript, pg. 477:16-8. 
55 Final Transcript, pgs 1119–22. 
56 ibid., pg. 322:3. 
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‘the dispute is not based on the purported sovereign rights of the UK as a coastal 
State in relation to the living resources in the EEZ. That is not how the dispute 
should be characterized..., the dispute concerns the rights of Mauritius. This 
includes its right to fish in the EEZ of the Chagos Archipelago; its right to be 
consulted about matters that can affect its interests; its right to have fulfilled the 
[UK’s undertaking]... it is these rights – the rights of Mauritius – that are at 
issue.’57 
Therefore, the essential claim of Mauritius did not arise under arts 63(2) and 64(1) LOSC, 
neither from art. 7 UNFSA, as it will be discussed in more detail below. These articles do not 
address sovereign, or otherwise afford a legal basis for, access to fisheries within the EEZ of 
a coastal State; and in a sense, this was a claim linked to sovereignty under the guise of 
conservation and management for fisheries within the MPA. Even, when Mauritius sought to 
deploy the secondary line of arguments in encompassing procedural obligations of 
consultation and cooperation owned to it under these provisions, as a fishing State for stocks 
in an area adjacent to the Chagos Archipelago,58 there was no material dispute crystallised at 
the time of initiating the proceedings with a bearing on the conservation and management 
measures. For instance, in citing selectively art. 7(3) UNFSA considering the obligation 
incumbent upon States to make ‘every effort to agree on compatible conservation and 
management measures within a reasonable period of time’,59  Mauritius notably failed to 
acknowledge that this obligation is provided in reference to a dispute over compatible 
measures as contemplated in paragraph 2 of that article. The disagreement underpinning 
Mauritius’ fourth submission with regard to straddling and highly migratory stocks did not 
raise, at least as it was presented in the Parties’ written submissions and oral pleadings, issues 
                                                          
57 ibid., pg. 477:19-25. 
58 ibid., pgs 321: 16-20, 335:17-20, and 336.  
59 ibid., pg. 335:7-9. 
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pertaining to a substantive dispute at the time when the settlement procedures were invoked. 
That would require Mauritius to argue consistently, or at least raise, issues arising from the 
proclaimed MPA pertaining to a negative impact on fish stocks within or adjacent and 
beyond the MPA. Yet, as rightly counter argued by the UK, in the face of the MPA 
establishing a ban on commercial fishing, any resultant dispute would have arisen in relation 
to Mauritius’ ongoing fishing beyond the MPA on account of possibly undermining the 
effectiveness of these measures throughout the stocks’ spread , and not vice-versa.60  
Secondly, the Tribunal in its reasoning invoked the authority of the 
Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago award, which was also debated between the Parties regarding 
its bearing on the procedural obligations under consideration. The fishery claim in that case 
had been brought up by Barbados in the form of an infra petita remedy during the oral 
pleadings, whereon the tribunal found itself lacking the jurisdiction to render a substantive 
decision on the fisheries access regime in the EEZ, but nevertheless pronounced on the duty 
upon the Parties ‘to agree upon the measures necessary to coordinate and ensure the 
conservation and development’ of the stock in question.61 The Chagos award accepted that 
‘articles 63 and 64 [LOSC] (as well as the [UNFSA]) are, on their face, measures in respect 
of fisheries and in their application in the [EEZ] subject to the exclusion in article 297(3)(a) 
[LOSC]’,62  but is not clear under what terms it invoked the authority above. It will be 
proposed here that the authority has been partially misapplied in the context of the Chagos 
Award for the reason that it was decided concerning the flying fish stocks in reference to art. 
63(1) LOSC, 63 addressing the so-called ‘shared’ stocks, and as such does not therefore relate 
to either straddling or highly migratory stocks, which constitute the focus of the Agreement. 
                                                          
60 ibid., pgs 894–5. 
61 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago award, pg. 226 §286. 
62 Award, pg. 117 §300.  
63 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago award, pg. 226 §283. 
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It should be noted that in the course of the pleadings by the Parties, including the references 
made by the Tribunal in the Award, the employment of the term straddling stocks in the 
context of art. 63 LOSC subsumed two different – in terms of jurisdictional provisions – 
types of fish stocks. While some of the claims were phrased by Mauritius in the terms of art. 
63(1) LOSC, the blanket application by the Tribunal insofar as arts 63(2) and 64(1) LOSC, as 
well as art. 7 UNFSA, are concerned is unfounded and especially with regards to highly 
migratory stocks in view of the pactum de contrahendo. Another relevant remark considering 
the application of the authority to bear in mind, in the light of paragraphs 1 and 2 of art. 63 
LOSC having in common a pactum de negotiando obligation, is that it was given in the 
context of the Convention alone, with the Agreement not being in force as between the 
Parties.64 
Finally, and in combing the observations above, the interpretation of the fishery 
limitation as presented in the Tribunal’s reasoning was confined within the Convention and 
not the Agreement.  For instance, a fundamental provision of the latter, which it would have 
been expected to feature in the Parties’ respective arguments and reasonably in the Tribunal’s 
reasoning is this of art. 3(1) UNFSA considering its application within areas of national 
jurisdiction as it will discussed in more detail below. In fact, Mauritius did so, yet, in an 
inconclusive manner that could be best described as merely ‘flagging up’ the provision,65 but 
utterly abandoning it thereafter. Plausibly this was in keeping with a tactical course that 
required seeing how it would play out on the arguments within its first and second 
                                                          
64 Barbados acceded to the Agreement on 22 September 2000, while Trinidad and Tobago only 5 
months after the award, on 13 September 2006. 
65 Memorial of the Republic of Mauritius (1 August 2012), volume I pg. 144 ¶7.66. 
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submissions, taking into account also any implications from the declaration filed upon its 
accession to the Convention and the Agreement.66  
From a purely procedural point of view, if not out of judicial policy considerations, 
the Tribunal’s distancing from the Agreement can be argued indeed as being the proper way 
to proceed in the case. The dispute in its entirety was brought within the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal on the basis solely of paragraph 1, and not paragraph 2 of art. 288 LOSC. Mauritius 
initiated arbitral proceedings pursuant to arts 286 and 287(5) LOSC,67 and only at the stage of 
filing its Memorial included a rather brief reference in a footnote whereby alluded to 
jurisdiction also under art. 30(1) UNFSA in respect of art. 7, 68 followed by a more assertive 
statement mentioning that ‘art. 30 of the Agreement provides that the dispute settlement 
provisions of the 1982 Convention apply to disputes regarding the interpretation or 
application of the Agreement’.69 This was not ignored by the UK, which in turn noted in 
filing its preliminary objections – also by means of a footnote, for obvious reasons – that ‘the 
Tribunal is not a court or tribunal to which a dispute has been submitted under Part VIII of 
the [A]greement’;70 a position that was reiterated in the same form also in the Counter-
Memorial. 71  
                                                          
66 Upon accession to both treaties on 25 March 1997, Mauritius filed a declaration that ‘rejects the 
inclusion of any reference to the so-called British Indian Ocean Territory by the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland as territories on whose behalf it could sign the said Agreement, 
and reaffirms its sovereignty over these islands, namely the Chagos Archipelago which form an 
integral part of the national territory of Mauritius and over their surrounding maritime spaces.’; see, 
[ST/LEG/SER.E/22] Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, XXI 7 ‘Law of the 
Sea’, p. 309. 
67 Republic of Mauritius, Notification under Article 287 and Annex VII, Article 1 of UNCLOS (20 
December 2010). 
68 Memorial of the Republic of Mauritius, pg. 87 ¶5.6, footnote 378. 
69 ibid., pg. 9 ¶5.35(viii). 
70 Preliminary Objections to Jurisdiction submitted by the United Kingdom (31 October 2012), pg. 39 
¶4.2, footnote 113. 
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While the concept of inducing a Party’s behaviour as to imply consent under the 
application, of something that imitates, the forum prorogatum principle could be appealing, 
no less by reading such jurisdiction between the footnotes, the question of having the dispute 
referred under the terms of the Agreement was not touched further upon by the Parties either 
in the Reply and Rejoinder submissions, or the oral pleadings. As a matter of fact, Mauritius 
not only abstained from fleshing out any such proposition but owning sensibly to how the 
dynamic of the arguments were shifted in the course of the pleadings in the context of the 
discussion over the Convention’s jurisdiction for sovereignty claims, it stated clearly that the 
‘claims were not submitted in accordance with the dispute settlement provisions of any other 
agreement’ but ‘in accordance with the dispute settlement provisions of Part XV of the 
Convention itself’, invoking the Tribunal’s jurisdiction expressly under art. 288(1), ‘because 
they arise directly under various substantive articles of the Convention, including art. 2(3), 
whose interpretation or application is clearly called for’.72 Moreover, the Tribunal founded 
unanimously its subject-matter jurisdiction upon art. 288(1) LOSC in relation to the fourth 
submission, 73  and this puts beyond any doubt that jurisdiction-wise the Chagos award 
confined the interpretation on the fishery limitation exclusively within the scope of the 
Convention, opting out of an inter-textual construction that would require to take account the 




                                                                                                                                                                                    
71 Counter-Memorial submitted by the United Kingdom (15 July 2013), pg. 132 ¶5.16, footnote 382. 
72 Final Transcript, pg. 484:6-13, as noted also in full quote by the Tribunal in the Award at pg. 107 
§269.   
73 Award, pgs 86 §204, and 215 §547(A3) as stated in the dispositif. 
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5 The Relationship between the Agreement and the Convention: consistency as 
interpretative requisite 
 
The question over the legal relationship between the Convention and the Agreement 
especially as to the interpretation and application of the respective rights and obligations far 
exceeds a simple reading of the latter’s formal title. The precise construction of the 
conceptual term ‘implementation’ bears particularly significant implications for the 
interpretation of both instruments; depending especially on whether the interpreter may take 
either a substantive or procedural approach through a constitutional discourse of international 
law.74 The legal relationship between the two treaties is being addressed in art. 4 UNFSA, 
where is stipulated that ‘nothing [therein] shall prejudice the rights, jurisdiction and duties of 
States under the Convention. This Agreement shall be interpreted and applied in the context 
of and in a manner consistent with the Convention.’ The requirement of consistency, 
therefore, constitutes essentially an interpretative rule for the understanding of its provisions. 
As it has been emphatically stated by the Chairman of the Fish Stocks Conference upon the 
conclusion of the Agreement,75 ‘[i]ts provisions are firmly based on the principles enshrined 
in the Convention. The Agreement and the Convention are intrinsically linked and are 
inseparable.’76 
Nonetheless, Treves had commented ex cathedra – in the Southern Bluefin Tuna case, 
of which some pronouncements featured during the proceedings of the Chagos arbitration – 
that although there are remarkable links between the two treaties, the Agreement is 
                                                          
74 eg., see supra footnote 4, and accompanying text. 
75 The United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, New 
York, 19 April 1993 – 4 August 1995. 
76 A/Conf.164/35. 
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independent from the Convention. 77  In this respect, it has been very appositely drawn 
attention to the fact that even though the Agreement intends to implement the specific 
provisions of the Convention, hence consistency between the two instruments shall be 
maintained, the latter due to its ambitious scope was not intended to contain detailed 
provisions on the specific topic of fish stocks and it provides only for ‘general obligations 
relating to the conservation and management of the living resources of coastal States’ 
exclusive zones and of the high seas.’78 Taking into account, moreover, ‘the intention to serve 
the general interest’, in the light of the Convention’s rudimentary provisions, there can be no 
doubt that the intention of the Agreement’s drafters was to fill the lacunae left by the 
Convention in respect of the obligation to cooperate in the conservation and management of 
the straddling and highly migratory stocks.79 Furthermore, Scovazzi, observes that the so-
called ‘implementation Agreement’ instead of merely implementing the Convention 
introduces substantial innovations thereto and thus the prudent word “implementation” is 
used with a broader sense being very close to the meaning of ‘change to improve’.80 In 
addition, the former ITLOS judge David Anderson also makes a similar remark by 
                                                          
77 Southern Bluefin Tuna (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan) Cases № 3 & 4, Provisional 
Measures, Order of 27 August 1999, ITLOS Reports 1999, p. 280, Separate Opinion of Judge Tulio 
Treves, at ¶10. For a further explanation of that statement see T. Treves, “The Settlement of Disputes 
According to the Straddling Stocks Agreement of 1995” in A.E. Boyle and D. Freestone, eds., 
International Law and Sustainable Development – Past Achievements and Future Challenges 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 253–69. 
78 G. Vigneron, “Compliance and International Environmental Agreements: A Case Study of the 1995 
United Nations Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement”, Georgetown Environmental Law Review 10 
(1998): 583. 
79 R. Rayfuse, “The United Nations Agreement on Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks as an 
Objective Regime: A Case of Wishful Thinking?”,  Australian Year Book of International Law 20 
(1999): 265. 
80  T. Scovazzi, “The Evolution of International Law of the Sea: New Issues, New Challenges”, 
Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International de la Haye 286 (2001): 143. 
 
 ‘ p r e - p e e r - r e v i e w e d ’  d r a f t  v e r s i o n  
 
considering art. 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties highly relevant 
with regard to the element of subsequent treaty practice. 81 Notwithstanding that the two 
instruments are intimately bound together, he argues that ‘in construing the relevant 
provisions of the Convention…it would probably now be considered appropriate…to take 
into account the terms of the Agreement, if only because the interpretation and application of 
a treaty are inextricably bound up with its implementation.’82 
In this vein, there is arguably scope left by the Convention wherein the provisions of 
the Agreement can be interpretatively expanded. The question of the relationship between the 
two instruments, and the fulfilment of the resulting requirement for consistent interpretation, 
accordingly bears particular significance especially with regard to art. 7 UNFSA in two 
respects. First, with regard to substantive law, attention shall be paid to the fact that in its 
opening paragraph it recites arts 63(2) and 64(1) LOSC. Secondly, in terms of procedural 
law, the Agreement applies under Part VIII mutatis mutandis – a legal expression bearing its 
very own interpretive difficulties and distinctive value – the entire sections 1 and 2 of Part 
XV LOSC, and art. 32 UNFSA introduces art. 297(3)(a) LOSC by reference, which unless be 
interpreted inter-textually, that is namely within the context, object and purpose of both the 
Convention and the Agreement, it is bound to give rise to clausal inconsistencies  in view 
inter alia of art. 7(4) UNFSA.  
 
6 The recitation of arts 63(2) and 64(1) LOSC in art. 7 UNFSA 
 
One of the main aims sought to be achieved in the Fish Stocks Conference was the 
clarification of the jurisdictional régime over straddling and highly migratory stocks. The 
                                                          
81 Signed at Vienna on 23 May 1969 and entered into force on 27 January 1980 [1155UNTS331]. 
82 D. Anderson, Modern Law of the Sea, Selected Essays (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), 
368. 
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Convention left that crucial question essentially unresolved, which resulted into great 
uncertainty as to States’ legal rights and obligations over such stocks while these were to be 
found in areas adjacent to, and beyond, the EEZ.83 The Agreement in addressing that question 
adopted a rule whereby envisages that conservation and management measures taken in the 
respective jurisdictional areas shall be compatible as to fulfil ‘[t]he objective of ensuring 
long-term conservation and sustainable use of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish 
stocks through effective implementation of the relevant provisions of the Convention.’84 
However, the rule of compatible conservation and management measures is regarded as 
representing one of the most controversial issues of the Agreement, 85  and therefore is 
expected to raise complex issues of interpretation.86 The controversy lies particularly in the 
legal uncertainty over the measures to be regarded as the basis of the conservation and 
management scheme. In other words, which measures shall be compatible with what 
measures? 87  In this respect, the phrasing of the chapeau in art. 7(2) UNFSA, vaguely 
provides that:  
                                                          
83 See, among others, F. Orrego-Vicuña, “Coastal States’ Competences over High Seas Fisheries and 
the Changing Role of International Law”, Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und 
Völkerrecht 55 (1995): 521, and W.T. Burke, “The Importance of the 1982 UN Convention on the 
Law of the Sea and its Future Development”, Ocean Development and International Law 27 (1996): 
2. 
84 UNFSA, art. 2. 
85  D. Nelson, “The Development of the Legal Regime of High Seas Fisheries”, in Boyle and 
Freestone, International Law and Sustainable Development – Past Achievements and Future 
Challenges (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 130. 
86A.G. Oude-Elferink, “The Determination of Compatible Conservation and Management Measures 
for Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks”, Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 
(2001): 553. 
87 See, D.A. Balton, “Strengthening the Law of the Sea: The New Agreement on Straddling Fish 
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks”, Ocean Development and International Law 27 (1996): 
137. 
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‘Conservation and management measures established for the high seas and those 
adopted for areas under national jurisdiction shall be compatible in order to 
ensure conservation and management of the straddling fish stocks and highly 
migratory fish stocks in their entirety. To this end, coastal States and States 
fishing on the high seas have a duty to cooperate for the purpose of achieving 
compatible measures in respect of such stocks’. 
However, in determining compatible conservation and management measures the Agreement 
enlists six criteria that need to be considered. In accordance to those criteria, States shall: (i) 
take into account the conservation and management measures adopted and applied in 
accordance with art. 61 LOSC in respect of the same stocks by coastal States within areas 
under national jurisdiction and ensure that measures established in respect of such stocks for 
the high seas do not undermine the effectiveness of such measures; (ii) take into account 
previously agreed measures established and applied for the high seas in accordance with the 
Convention in respect of the same stocks by relevant coastal States and States fishing on the 
high seas; (iii) take into account previously agreed measures established and applied in 
accordance with the Convention in respect of the same stocks by a subregional or regional 
fisheries management organization or arrangement; (iv) take into account the biological unity 
and other biological characteristics of the stocks and the relationships between the 
distribution of the stocks, the fisheries and the geographical particularities of the region 
concerned, including the extent to which the stocks occur and are fished in areas under 
national jurisdiction; (v) take into account the respective dependence of the coastal States and 
the States fishing on the high seas on the stocks concerned; and finally (vi) ensure that such 
measures do not result in harmful impact on the living marine resources as a whole. 88 
                                                          
88 UNFSA, art. 7(2)(a-f). 
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Still, the crucial question being involved in the interpretation of the rule of 
compatibility relates to the specific legal meaning that the word ‘compatibility’ conveys 
regarding the imposition of a bidirectional obligation to coastal and high seas fishing States. 
While is not to be questioned that the rule imposes in principle a common and shared 
obligation to the respective categories of States, the symmetry of such obligation is being 
seriously debated. The crux of this question necessitates as a corollary also the clarification of 
the legal effect that the jurisdictional differentiation between the legal régime of straddling 
and highly migratory stocks entails for the interpretation and application of the compatibility 
rule. It has been rightly proposed that in interpreting the rule of compatibility as provided in 
paragraph 2, due regard shall be paid to paragraph 1 of art. 7. More specifically, as mentioned 
above, paragraph 1 reintroduces the two separate conservation and management régimes for 
straddling and highly migratory stocks, respectively. In particular, lit.(a) stipulates that, ‘with 
respect to straddling fish stocks…coastal States and the States whose nationals fish for such 
stocks in the adjacent high seas area, shall seek…to agree upon the measures necessary for 
the conservation of these stocks in the adjacent high seas area’. Respectively, lit.(b) provides 
that ‘with respect to highly migratory fish stocks…States and other States whose nationals 
fish for such stocks in the region shall cooperate…with a view to ensuring conservation and 
promoting the objective of optimum utilization of such stocks throughout the region…’ 
(emphasis added). Thus, paragraph 1 of the compatibility article in this respect tentatively 
reaffirms the distinction between the two types of stocks contained in the Convention, and 
renders paragraph 1 an important part of the context for the interpretation of paragraph 2. 
Essentially, this means that in determining compatible conservation and management 
measures any interpretation of the rule in order to fulfil the requirement of consistency should 
be extremely careful as to reiterate the respective jurisdictional balance envisaged in those 
articles under the Convention, and to avoid in the context of the Agreement tilting the balance 
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in favour of either of the interests involved.89 This requirement thus immediately dismisses 
any favouritism as that proclaimed for instance, in the proceedings of the Chagos arbitration, 
by the UK in mentioning briefly, and in passing, that the obligation for coastal States to take 
account of the conservation measures applied to the adjacent high seas areas ‘is a much 
weaker’ one.90  
The re-introduction of this jurisdictional division under paragraph 1 poses subsequently 
a challenge to the concept of compatibility, given that the object and purpose of the rule is to 
address the difficulties, which originally arose from those provisions in the context of the 
Convention. Under the compatibility rule, it appears consequently that the Agreement 
introduces an ecosystem management area of a single biological unity with two jurisdictional 
systems.91 However, the text of the Agreement itself remains rather equivocal on this matter 
when the geographical scope of the compatibility rule is to be taken into account, with art. 
3(1) ambiguously stipulating that:   
‘Unless otherwise provided, this Agreement applies to the conservation and 
management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks beyond 
areas under national jurisdiction, except that articles 6 and 7 apply also to the 
conservation and management of such stocks within areas under national 
jurisdiction, subject to the different legal regimes that apply within areas under 
national jurisdiction and in areas beyond national jurisdiction as provided for in 
the Convention.’ 
                                                          
89 Oude-Elferink, 555-6. 
90 Final Transcript, pg. 894:8-9. 
91 F. Orrego-Vicuña, “The International Law of High Seas Fisheries: From Freedom of Fishing to 
Sustainable Use”, in O.S Stokke, ed., Governing High Seas Fisheries, The Interplay of Global and 
Regional Regimes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 38–40. 
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The uncertainty created from the circularity of the above stipulation is obvious. While is 
provided that the rule of compatibility under the Agreement does ‘apply also to the 
conservation and management of such stocks within areas under national jurisdiction’, it 
simultaneously subjects this applicability ‘to the different legal regimes that apply within 
areas under national jurisdiction and in areas beyond national jurisdiction’ under the 
Convention. 
The last clause of course bears great significance with respect to the application of the 
compatibility rule to straddling stocks régimes. The oxymoron conclusion that seems to arise 
from a first reading is that the rule of compatibility applies also to stocks within areas under 
national jurisdiction subject to art. 63(2) LOSC – as also reproduced in art. 7(1)(a) – which 
provides that States shall seek to agree upon the measures necessary for the conservation of 
these stocks “in the adjacent area”. The case of straddling stocks becomes even more 
controversial in taking into account that, art. 5(a) UNFSA, specifies that ‘coastal States and 
States fishing on the high seas shall, in giving effect to their duty to cooperate…adopt 
measures to ensure long-term sustainability of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory 
fish stocks and promote the objective of their optimum utilization’. On the one hand, the 
Agreement by setting out this common objective not only overcomes the controversial 
obligation of pactum de negotiando but also unifies in terms of management approach the 
two conservation régimes since it sets as a general principle that straddling stocks shall be 
also conserved and managed with the aim of optimum utilization, as highly migratory stocks 
and the fishery resources within EEZ.92 On the other hand, however, the general principle of 
art. 5(a) UNFSA seems to raise a tension with art. 7(1)(a) UNFSA, which does not provide 
                                                          
92 LOSC art. 62(1), stipulates that ‘the coastal State shall promote the objective of optimum utilization 
of the living resources in the [EEZ] without prejudice to art. 61 [i.e., to the aim of conservation]’. 
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for this aim. Unless the latter receives a restrictive interpretation as to conform to the general 
principle there will be a legal non sequitur between the two provisions.93 
 
7 The interpretation of the fishery limitation in the Agreement 
 
As shown in the Chagos award, compulsory procedures under the Convention may be 
hindered through the operation of the fishery limitation as it is furnished in art. 297(3)(a) 
LOSC regarding disputes relating to coastal States’ sovereign rights with respect to the living 
resources in the EEZ. It will be also recalled that the same limitation is introduced en bloc 
into Part III UNFSA through art. 32 thereof, which laconically stipulates that ‘Article 297, 
paragraph 3, of the Convention applies also to this Agreement’. The intrinsic uncertainty 
dominating the original text of the limitation under the Convention has thus given rise to two 
conflicting approaches of interpretation thereon also in the context of art. 32 UNFSA. 
Namely, the first approach is one that broadly interprets the procedural aspect of the fishery 
limitation as to bar the principle of compulsory settlement applying on disputes related to 
these stocks. This approach is associated with the interpretations of compatibility rule in art. 7 
UNFSA that favour the extension of coastal States rights seawards in areas beyond the EEZ. 
On the other hand, there is the approach that interprets restrictively the fishery limitation as to 
allow compulsory procedures to apply on straddling and highly migratory stocks on the 
                                                          
93 For this purposive interpretation in reading the general principle in art. 5 lit.(a) as not attaching 
particular importance to the conceptual difference between the two jurisdictional regimes under the 
Convention, but to the contrary the Agreement’s deliberate intention lies in unifying them in terms of 
management, see. A. Tahindro, “Conservation and Management of Transboundary Fish Stocks: 
Comments in Light of the Adoption of the 1995 Agreement for the Conservation and Management of 
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks”, Ocean Development and International 
Law 28 (1997): 9–10. 
 
 ‘ p r e - p e e r - r e v i e w e d ’  d r a f t  v e r s i o n  
 
premise that such stocks are not susceptible wholly to the exclusive jurisdiction of coastal 
States.  
 
The broad interpretation of the fishery limitation 
 
A number of academic commentaries have admittedly advanced an approach in favour of 
interpreting, still with some cautiousness, broadly the fishery limitation. For instance, it has 
been acknowledged that throughout the Fish Stocks Conference there was a ‘general 
recognition of the important biological unity’ attached to these stocks. This recognition was 
manifested in the text of the Agreement through the general principles governing the 
conservation and management of stocks and more specifically in the adoption of the 
compatibility rule. However, a broad interpretation on art. 297(3) LOSC, would not lead to 
the ‘uniting of the procedures for the settlement of disputes for the whole geographical 
distribution of these stocks’94. Hence, the compulsory settlement provisions may be seen as 
operating essentially only in favour of coastal States, which may launch a challenge against 
any high seas fishing State resulting in compulsory binding procedures with respect to 
measures undermining the respective conservation and management measures that have been 
established for the same stock in its EEZ. The same would not apply for high seas States due 
to the operation of art. 297(3) LOSC. This asymmetrical obligation is viewed to exist because 
coastal States enjoy sovereign rights regarding fisheries within its EEZ.95 
The broad scope of such interpretations is derived mainly from academic 
commentaries analysing the text of the limitation exclusively in the context of the 
                                                          
94 Tahindro, 49. 
95 E. Meltzer, The Quest for Sustainable International Fisheries, Regional Efforts to Implement the 
1995 United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement  (Ottawa: National Research Council of Canada, 2009), 
207. 
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Convention. For instance, a traditional view in this respect is that ‘certain disputes relating to 
fisheries will be completely excluded from the dispute settlement system due to the broad 
discretionary power of the coastal States with respect to several aspects of coastal fisheries’ 
and furthermore ‘the substantive discretion is so broad and plenary that it is no easy to 
imagine a situation in which third States would have the right to question the exercise of the 
sovereign rights of the coastal State.’96 These quotes may read familiar to those who will 
recall the Tribunal’s views in paragraph 297 of the Chagos Award. 97 
In sum, the arguments embracing a broad interpretation on the cross-reference of the 
Convention’s fishery limitation in art. 32 UNFSA, consider the latter as continuing an 
explicit desire by States not to subject national decisions respecting marine living resource 
use within their EEZ to compulsory third-party adjudication.98 Discretional fishery measures 
by coastal States will remain unaffected by the compulsory dispute settlement procedures of 
the Agreement, either generally or in specific terms; eg., in determining total allowable 
catches, etc.99 Overall, the part of academic commentary that reaches a conclusion towards 
the broad interpretation on the limitation varies from firmly supporting in a same manner the 
view that disputes over such stocks are definitely excluded from compulsory jurisdiction 
under the Convention, yet remaining silent as to the effect thereon of the procedures through 
the Agreement, 100  to views that assume more resolutely that the Agreement, like the 
                                                          
96 e.g., de Mestral, 184. 
97 See, supra footnote 17, and accompanying text. 
98 L.T. McDorman, “The Dispute Settlement Regime of the Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks Convention”, Canadian Yearbook of International Law 35 (1997): 66. 
99 Orrego-Vicuña, 36. 
100 M.A. Orellana, “The Law on Highly Migratory Fish Stocks: ITLOS Jurisprudence in Context”, 
Golden Gate University Law Review 34 (2004): 460. 
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Convention,  does not address fishery disputes of this kind without the consent of the coastal 
State.101 
 
The restrictive interpretation of the fishery limitation 
 
On the other hand, it has been developed an approach advocating a restrictive interpretation 
on art. 32 UNFSA, which advances that compatibility disputes are not subject to the fishery 
limitation. Notwithstanding that the Agreement incorporates the dispute settlement 
procedures of the latter, their application shall be consonant with the substantive law 
provided in the former. Arguments affirming the validity of this purposive interpretation 
point out that ‘in the light of [art. 3], the question that arises in interpreting art. 32 UNFSA is 
whether disputes concerning the interpretation or application of arts 6 and/or 7 UNFSA may 
be referred unilaterally to adjudication under the settlement procedures provided for in the 
Convention.’102 In other words, the interpretation of the fishery limitation in the Convention 
shall be construed restrictively within the interpretative context of the lex specialis principles 
under the Agreement; such as the principle of precautionary approach and compatibility rule. 
It shall be here once again be recalled that in respect to these principles the Agreement 
geographically applies explicitly to the conservation and management of both straddling and 
highly migratory fish stocks also “within areas under national jurisdiction”.103  
In this respect, academic commentary – Kwiatwoska, for instance – although favouring 
a broad interpretation of art. 297(3) LOSC, remain uncertain about the interpretation of the 
same limitation under art. 32 UNFSA. At this point, it may be worth looking in some more 
                                                          
101 A. Zumwalt, A. “Straddling Stocks Spawn Fish War on the High Seas”, University of California 
Davis International Law and Policy 3 (1997): 56. 
102 Treves, 258. 
103 UNFSA, art 3(1). 
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detail at her views on the Southern Bluefin Tuna case having in mind the references made 
thereto in the Chagos proceedings. More specifically, reflecting on the fact that ITLOS’ 
provisional measures Order in the Southern Bluefin Tuna case did not consider the 
applicability of the fishery limitation, she viewed that this presumably applies to the stocks in 
question, in spite of the high seas fishing States rights being inseparable from the sovereign 
rights enjoyed by coastal State’s within EEZ.104 Nevertheless, she implied, in the light of the 
final remarks made by the tribunal in its award regarding the dispute settlement procedures 
under the Agreement, that the impact of art. 297(3) LOSC, may not affect disputes arising 
under the principles of precautionary approach and compatibility, which are applicable to 
both the EEZ and the high seas.105 Similarly, other commentators also commenting on the 
Order considered ITLOS to had left open the question of whether its provisional measures 
were to apply only to the high seas or include the EEZ in order to avoid becoming involved in 
the controversy over the application of the fishery limitation upon the compulsory settlement 
procedures of the Part XV of the Convention.106 
                                                          
104 B. Kwiatkowska, “The Australia and New Zealand v. Japan Southern Bluefin Tuna (Jurisdiction 
and Admissibility) Award of the First Law of the Sea Convention Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal”, 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 16 (2001): 276. 
105  B. Kwiatkowska, “International Decisions – Southern Bluefin Tuna”, American Journal of 
International Law 95 (2001): 167, and by the same author “The Australia and New Zealand v. Japan 
Southern Bluefin Tuna (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) Award of the First Law of the Sea Convention 
Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal”, International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 16 (2001): 278, 
wherein is viewed that ‘it seems that both the ITLOS and the Arbitral Tribunal have given important 
guidance and encouragement  [to the application of compulsory settlement]’. 
106 q.v., R.R. Churchill, “International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea the Southern Bluefin Tuna 
Cases (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan): Order for Provisional Measures of 27 August 
1999”, International & Comparative Law Quarterly 49 (2000): 987–8; for a more comprehensive 
exposition of his views on the applicability of limitations to compulsory jurisdiction in contentious 
cases, see R. Churchill, “Some Reflections on the Operation of the Dispute Settlement System of the 
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Commentaries that would not preclude a restrictive interpretation of the limitation 
argue, as for example by Oxman in this respect, that ‘it is important to bear in mind that art. 
297 does not by any means exclude all disputes concerning the exercise of coastal State rights 
in the areas affected…[and that] these exclusions do not apply to matters such as high seas 
fisheries beyond the EEZ.’107 This view is also espoused by Boyle, and in following a similar 
argument to that propounded by Treves, as discussed above, states in a forthright way that: 
‘The question whether disputes concerning all or part of a straddling stock fall 
inside or outside compulsory jurisdiction is thus more than a technical question of 
treaty interpretation. It poses some fundamental questions about the nature of 
equitable utilisation as a legal principle governing use of common resources. Both 
in the interests of equitable access to justice, and the effective management and 
sustainable use of straddling stocks, compulsory jurisdiction should apply to all 
aspects of such a dispute. The rights of coastal states must of course be 
maintained, but they should also be accountable for compliance with their 
obligations insofar as these affect other states or the international community as a 
whole. The exception for sovereign rights created by article 297(3) of the 
Convention and incorporated in the 1995 Agreement should thus be construed 
narrowly, to cover only the exercise of coastal State discretion on matters that are 
purely of EEZ concern only, i.e., matters which do not affect straddling stocks, 
whether inside or outside the EEZ.’108 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea During its First Decade”, in D. Freestone et al. , eds., The Law 
of the Sea, Progress and Prospects (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 407–9. 
107 B.H. Oxman, “The Rule of Law and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea”, 
European Journal of International Law 7 (1996): 368. 
108 Boyle, 1–2. 
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Klein, also arrives at the same conclusion by recalling the reliance of the high seas fishing 
provisions as well as of those governing straddling and highly migratory stocks, on the 
availability of compulsory settlement procedures to elaborate on the content of obligations 
with regard to cooperation and conservation in case of disputes. It is further noted that the 
Agreement, which has been specifically concluded in order to implement these provisions 
under the Convention, will be able to achieve the sought balance of interests between coastal 
and high seas fishing States by providing a court or tribunal with compulsory jurisdiction to 
resolve such disputes and thus safeguard the respective rights. 109  Considering that 
environmental treaties often lack precision in terms of objective rules of conduct and are 
deeply ambivalent in terms of their objects and purposes, Stephens puts forward a similar 
argument in viewing that especially the high seas fisheries provisions in Convention were 
drafted under a procedural tactic with the expectation that open substantive questions will be 
later resolved in an international court or diplomatic body.110 Boyle, once again, makes even 
a more audacious statement, to the same direction with Klein and Stephen, in perceiving 
essentially the Agreement as a context of continuous interpretation of the Convention’s 
fishery provisions; given their inherently evolutionary nature insofar as they set standards for 
the conservation and management measures that States are required to take in the EEZ and on 
the high seas.111 
                                                          
109 N. Klein, Dispute Settlement in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 204. 
110  T. Stephens, “The Limits of International Adjudication in International Environmental Law: 
Another Perspective on the Southern Bluefin Tuna Case”, International Journal of Marine and 
Coastal Law 19 (2004): 173, 191–2.  
111 A.E. Boyle, ‘Further Development of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea: Mechanisms for 
Change’, in Freestone et al., 48. I have not quoted Boyle’s views expressed in A.E. Boyle, “Dispute 
Settlement and the Law of the Sea Convention: Problems of Fragmentation and Jurisdiction”, 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 46 (1997), as himself stated (Final Transcript, pg. 
812:9-12) that his views therein were consistent with the argument pleaded on behalf of the UK, 
 





The Chagos Award, while it focused on several provisions of the Convention being common 
to the Agreement – ie., arts 63(2), 64(1), and 297(3)(a) LOSC, did not interpret any of these 
within the context of the latter in spite of the Mauritius’ submission citing – albeit in a rather 
fragmented, if not selective – fashion, art. 7 UNFSA as one of the grounds; as discussed 
earlier nevertheless Mauritius did not follow through its own argument. In fact, the Tribunal 
as seen, at least in the text of the Award, did not rely its analysis on the Agreement, but rather 
confined it entirely within the Convention. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note in its obiter 
dictum with regards to the Agreement the views expressed, where it held that:  
‘The Tribunal is aware of the view, advanced in certain academic settings, that 
article 297(3) should be construed narrowly in its application to arts 63 and 64 
[LOSC] and to the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement on the grounds that the entire 
purpose of the special regime for these species is to enable populations to be 
managed as a unified whole, and that this object and purpose is potentially 
frustrated by providing distinct dispute resolution regimes for such species in the 
exclusive economic zone and in the high seas. However desirable this purpose 
may be as a matter of policy, the Tribunal can see no textual basis for such a 
construction in either the Convention or the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement. The 
latter agreement afforded ample opportunity to remedy any ambiguity of drafting 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
despite being invoked differently in the Reply of the Republic of Mauritius (18 November 2013), 
Volume III. 
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in the earlier Convention, but nevertheless expressly provides that ‘Article 297, 
paragraph 3, of the Convention applies also to this Agreement’.112 
 
In relation to the above passage, it will be quite pertinent to recall a relevant comment made 
also in passing, this time by the arbitral tribunal in the Southern Bluefin Tuna case, where 
while resigning itself to the fact that Part XV of the Convention ‘falls significantly short of 
establishing a truly comprehensive regime of compulsory jurisdiction’,113 it noted that when 
the Agreement comes into force ‘should for State parties to it, not to go far towards resolving 
procedural problems’, as thereunder ‘the articles relating to peaceful settlement of disputes 
are specified by substantive provisions more detailed and far reaching than the pertinent 
provisions [of the Convention]’.114   Whatever may be the worth of obiters, one cannot 
disregard the irony when these two are to be read together.  
The restrictive interpretation of art. 32 UNFSA, and by extension of art. 297(3)(a) 
LOSC, does not contradict the stipulation that the former ‘shall be interpreted and applied in 
the context of and in a manner consistent with the Convention.’115 The rationale of the 
restrictive approach, in general, views that the indeterminate wording of the limitation shall 
not be construed as to give any degree of primacy to coastal States, which would thus endorse 
a false impression emanating itself not from a point of law but rather from the inaccurate 
perception that only coastal States bear a genuine interest in the conservation and 
management of such stocks.116 This kind of belief has been long in decline as evidenced in 
                                                          
112 Award, pgs 117–8, §301.  
113  Southern Bluefin Tuna cases (Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Decision of 4 August 
2000), pg. 45 ¶62. 
114 ibid., at pg. 48 ¶71. 
115 UNFSA, art. 4. 
116  For instance, it has been argued that ‘[a] tip of the balance toward coastal state interests is 
beneficial, since the coastal states are probably more ‘invested’ in the long-term health of the 
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numerous collapses of stocks within national jurisdiction, and subsequent treaty 
developments at many key fishery regions. To the contrary, and on the point of law, it would 
constitute a contra legem interpretation to construe broadly a limitation like this, which was 
adopted with the view of excluding high seas States fishing within the EEZ;117 in the sense 
that such broad interpretation will not any more fulfil its purpose to exclude essentially high 
seas fishing States “ in”  the EEZ but it inversely expands coastal rights beyond the EEZ onto 
the high seas.118 In this respect, the restrictive interpretation on the limitation of compulsory 
dispute settlement is more harmonious with one of the main purposes underlying the régime 
of the Agreement, which is to eliminate any scope for creeping jurisdiction.119  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
straddling stock resource than a distant-water fishing nation, and thus, are more motivated to preserve 
that resource’, see W. Martin, “Fisheries Conservation and Management of Straddling Stocks and 
Highly Migratory Stocks under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea”, Georgetown 
Environmental Law Review 7 (1995): 766.  
117 For the latent tendency of coastal rights expansion seawards inhabiting the concept of limitations 
see G. Erasmus, “Dispute Settlement in the Law of the Sea”, Acta Juridica, 1 (1986): 22. 
118  per Treves, this is explained easily if considered that the concept of EEZ presents two 
complementary aspects: on the one hand, an important extension of the rights of the coastal States, 
and, on the other the prescription of a limit to these new rights, in particular in terms of space; qv., T. 
Treves, “La Pêcheen Haute Mer et l’Avenir de la Convention des Nations Unies sur le Droit de la 
Mer”, Annuaire Français 38 (1992), 889. 
119 C. Higgenson, “The Law of the Sea Convention and the Protection of Fisheries”, Georgetown 
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